Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1571762
 
 

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Performance Measurement as a Political Discipline Mechanism


Anthony M. Bertelli


USC Price School of Public Policy; USC Gould School of Law; University of Birmingham

Peter John


University College London - School of Public Policy

September 9, 2010

USC CLEO Research Paper No. C10-5
USC Law Legal Studies Paper No. 10-5

Abstract:     
Governments at one level increasingly develop measures of the activities of policymakers at another. That policymaking behavior as well as the measures can have electoral consequences. A large literature has developed in public administration and policy that assesses the determinants and validity of performance measures and their influence on the strategic behavior of public organizations. While recognizing the progress made by this line of research, we introduce a theoretical framework that accounts for the political context in which performance measures emerge and are implemented. Specifically, we claim that superordinate governments use these kinds of performance measures as a political discipline mechanism (PDM) to incentivize the behavior of subordinate governments. We present a formal model and derive a set of testable implications of interest to researchers on performance management and bureaucratic politics

Number of Pages in PDF File: 32

Keywords: Performance Measures, Distributive Politics, Bureaucratic Control, Public Administration and Management

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Date posted: March 25, 2010 ; Last revised: November 12, 2013

Suggested Citation

Bertelli, Anthony M. and John, Peter, Performance Measurement as a Political Discipline Mechanism (September 9, 2010). USC CLEO Research Paper No. C10-5; USC Law Legal Studies Paper No. 10-5. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1571762 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1571762

Contact Information

Anthony M. Bertelli (Contact Author)
USC Price School of Public Policy ( email )
Los Angeles, CA 90089-0626
United States
USC Gould School of Law
699 Exposition Boulevard
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States

University of Birmingham
School of Government and Society
Edgbaston
Birmingham, B15 2TT
United Kingdom
Peter John
University College London - School of Public Policy ( email )
29/30 Tavistock Square
London, WC1H 9QU
United Kingdom
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