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The Strategic Use of CEO Compensation in Labor Contract NegotiationsFeng JiangTulane University - A.B. Freeman School of Business Erik LieUniversity of Iowa - Henry B. Tippie College of Business Tingting QueUniversity of Iowa - Henry B. Tippie College of Business August 1, 2010 Abstract: We study whether firms strategically alter CEO compensation to improve their bargaining position with labor unions. We conjecture that (i) firms in heavily unionized industries offer lower compensation packages to their CEOs than do their non-union counterparts, (ii) unionized firms temporarily curtail CEO compensation before union contract negotiations, and (iii) the curtailment in compensation will be most pronounced for option grants due to their discretionary nature. Our results support these conjectures.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 44 Keywords: Executive compensation, Labor union, collective bargaining JEL Classification: J52, M52 working papers seriesDate posted: March 22, 2010 ; Last revised: March 16, 2011Suggested CitationContact Information
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