Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1572219
 
 

References (40)



 
 

Citations (12)



 


 



Do Anti-Takeover Provisions Spur Corporate Innovation?


Thomas J. Chemmanur


Boston College - Carroll School of Management

Xuan Tian


Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance

August 1, 2016

AFA 2012 Chicago Meetings Paper

Abstract:     
We study the effect of antitakeover provisions (ATPs) on corporate innovation. We establish causality using a regression discontinuity design that relies on locally exogenous variation generated by shareholder proposal votes. We find a positive, causal effect of ATPs on innovation. This positive effect is more pronounced in firms that are subject to a larger degree of information asymmetry and operate in more competitive product markets. The evidence suggests that ATPs help nurture innovation by insulating managers from short-term pressures arising from equity markets. Finally, the number of ATPs contributes positively to firm value for firms involved in intensive innovation activities.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 53

Keywords: anti-takeover provisions, innovation, firm value

JEL Classification: G34, G38, O31


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Date posted: March 17, 2010 ; Last revised: August 28, 2016

Suggested Citation

Chemmanur, Thomas J. and Tian, Xuan, Do Anti-Takeover Provisions Spur Corporate Innovation? (August 1, 2016). AFA 2012 Chicago Meetings Paper. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1572219 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1572219

Contact Information

Thomas J. Chemmanur
Boston College - Carroll School of Management ( email )
440 Fulton Hall
Boston College
Chestnut Hill, MA 02467-3808
United States
617-552-3980 (Phone)
617-552-0431 (Fax)
Xuan Tian (Contact Author)
Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance ( email )
1309 E. Tenth Street
Bloomington, IN 47405
United States
812-8553420 (Phone)
824-8555875 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://kelley.iu.edu/tianx

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