Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1572407
 
 

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The Credit Crisis Around the Globe: Why Did Some Banks Perform Better?


Andrea Beltratti


Bocconi University - Department of Finance

Rene M. Stulz


Ohio State University (OSU) - Department of Finance; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

February 11, 2011

Charles A. Dice Center Working Paper No. 2010-5
Fisher College of Business Working Paper No. 2010-03-005

Abstract:     
Though overall bank performance from July 2007 to December 2008 was the worst since the Great Depression, there is significant variation in the cross-section of stock returns of large banks across the world during that period. We use this variation to evaluate the importance of factors that have been put forth as having contributed to the poor performance of banks during the credit crisis. The evidence is supportive of theories that emphasize the fragility of banks financed with short-term capital market funding. The better-performing banks had less leverage and lower returns immediately before the crisis. Differences in banking regulations across countries are generally uncorrelated with the performance of banks during the crisis, except that large banks from countries with more restrictions on bank activities performed better and decreased loans less. Our evidence poses a substantial challenge to those who argue that poor bank governance was a major cause of the crisis because we find that banks with more shareholder-friendly boards performed significantly worse during the crisis than other banks, were not less risky before the crisis, and reduced loans more during the crisis,

Number of Pages in PDF File: 43

JEL Classification: G01, G15, G18, G21, G32, G34

working papers series





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Date posted: March 16, 2010 ; Last revised: February 14, 2011

Suggested Citation

Beltratti , Andrea and Stulz, Rene M., The Credit Crisis Around the Globe: Why Did Some Banks Perform Better? (February 11, 2011). Charles A. Dice Center Working Paper No. 2010-5; Fisher College of Business Working Paper No. 2010-03-005. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1572407 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1572407

Contact Information

Andrea Beltratti
Bocconi University - Department of Finance ( email )
Via Roentgen 1
Milano, MI 20136
Italy
Rene M. Stulz (Contact Author)
Ohio State University (OSU) - Department of Finance ( email )
2100 Neil Avenue
Columbus, OH 43210-1144
United States
HOME PAGE: http://www.cob.ohio-state.edu/fin/faculty/stulz

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
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