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Credit Rating and CompetitionNelson CamanhoLondon School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Financial Markets Group Pragyan DebLondon School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Financial Markets Group; Bank of England Zijun LiuLondon School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Financial Markets Group July 2012 22nd Australasian Finance and Banking Conference 2009 AFA 2011 Denver Meetings Paper Abstract: We develop a theoretical model to analyse the e ect of competition on the conflict of interest arising from the issuer pay compensation model of the credit rating industry. We nd that relative to monopoly, rating agencies are more likely to inflate ratings under competition, resulting in lower expected welfare. These results do not depend on the presence of ratings shopping as in Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro (2012) and Skreta and Veldkamp (2009), but instead focus on the trade-o ff between maintaining reputation (to increase profi ts in the future) and in ating ratings today (to increase current pro fits). Our results suggest that ongoing regulatory initiatives aimed at increasing competition in the ratings industry may reduce overall welfare, unless new entrants have a higher reputation via-a-vis incumbents.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 44 Keywords: Rating agencies, competition, reputation, repeated games, financial regulation JEL Classification: C73, D43, D82, D83, G24 working papers seriesDate posted: March 21, 2010 ; Last revised: August 2, 2012Suggested CitationContact Information
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