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Can Managers Use Discretionary Accruals to Ease Financial Constraints? Evidence from Discretionary Accruals Prior to Investment


James S. Linck


Southern Methodist University

Jeffry M. Netter


University of Georgia - Department of Banking and Finance; University of Georgia Law School

Tao Shu


University of Georgia - Department of Banking and Finance

February 27, 2013


Abstract:     
Despite a large literature on discretionary accruals, how the use of discretionary accruals impacts corporate financial decisions is not well understood. We hypothesize that a financially constrained firm with valuable projects can use discretionary accruals to credibly signal positive prospects, enabling it to raise capital to make the investments. We examine a large panel of firms during 1987 to 2009 and find that financially constrained firms with good investment opportunities have significantly higher discretionary accruals prior to investment compared to their unconstrained counterparts. Constrained high-accrual firms have higher earnings-announcement returns than constrained low-accrual firms, obtain more equity and debt financing, and invest in projects that appear to improve performance. These results provide supporting evidence that the use of discretionary accruals can help constrained firms with valuable projects ease those constraints and increase firm value.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 52

Keywords: Financial constraints, discretionary accruals, investment, signaling, valuation, external financing

JEL Classification: G31

working papers series


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Date posted: March 22, 2010 ; Last revised: March 3, 2013

Suggested Citation

Linck, James S., Netter, Jeffry M. and Shu, Tao, Can Managers Use Discretionary Accruals to Ease Financial Constraints? Evidence from Discretionary Accruals Prior to Investment (February 27, 2013). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1573147 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1573147

Contact Information

James S. Linck
Southern Methodist University ( email )
Cox School of Business
Dallas, TX 75275
United States
214-768-3933 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://cox.smu.edu
Jeffry M. Netter
University of Georgia - Department of Banking and Finance ( email )
Terry College of Business
Athens, GA 30602-6253
United States
706-542-3654 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.terry.uga.edu/finance/facultyprofiles/n
University of Georgia Law School
Athens, GA 30602
United States
Tao Shu (Contact Author)
University of Georgia - Department of Banking and Finance ( email )
Department of Finance
Terry College of Business, University of Georgia
Athens, GA 30602
United States
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