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Internal Corporate Governance, CEO Turnover, and Earnings Management


Sonali Hazarika


Baruch College, CUNY

Jonathan M. Karpoff


University of Washington - Michael G. Foster School of Business

Rajarishi Nahata


City University of New York, CUNY Baruch College - Zicklin School of Business - Department of Economics and Finance

October 17, 2011

Journal of Financial Economics (JFE), 2012 (104), 44-69.

Abstract:     
The likelihood and speed of forced CEO turnover - but not voluntary turnover - are positively related to a firm’s earnings management. These patterns persist in tests that consider the effects of earnings restatements, regulatory enforcement actions, and the possible endogeneity of CEO turnover and earnings management. The relation between earnings management and forced turnover occurs both in firms with good and bad performance, and when the accruals work to inflate or deflate reported earnings. These results indicate that boards tend to act proactively to discipline managers who manage earnings aggressively, before the manipulations lead to costly external consequences.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 60

Keywords: Management turnover, earnings management, corporate governance

JEL Classification: G38, K22, K42, M41

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Date posted: March 22, 2010 ; Last revised: January 15, 2013

Suggested Citation

Hazarika, Sonali, Karpoff, Jonathan M. and Nahata, Rajarishi, Internal Corporate Governance, CEO Turnover, and Earnings Management (October 17, 2011). Journal of Financial Economics (JFE), 2012 (104), 44-69.. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1573190

Contact Information

Sonali Hazarika
Baruch College, CUNY ( email )
17 Lexington Avenue
New York, NY 10010
United States
Jonathan M. Karpoff (Contact Author)
University of Washington - Michael G. Foster School of Business ( email )
Box 353200
Seattle, WA 98195-3200
United States
206-685-4954 (Phone)
206-221-6856 (Fax)
Rajarishi Nahata
City University of New York, CUNY Baruch College - Zicklin School of Business - Department of Economics and Finance ( email )
17 Lexington Avenue
New York, NY 10010
United States
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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