Internal Corporate Governance, CEO Turnover, and Earnings Management
Baruch College, CUNY
Jonathan M. Karpoff
University of Washington - Michael G. Foster School of Business
City University of New York, CUNY Baruch College - Zicklin School of Business - Department of Economics and Finance
October 17, 2011
Journal of Financial Economics (JFE), 2012 (104), 44-69.
The likelihood and speed of forced CEO turnover - but not voluntary turnover - are positively related to a firm’s earnings management. These patterns persist in tests that consider the effects of earnings restatements, regulatory enforcement actions, and the possible endogeneity of CEO turnover and earnings management. The relation between earnings management and forced turnover occurs both in firms with good and bad performance, and when the accruals work to inflate or deflate reported earnings. These results indicate that boards tend to act proactively to discipline managers who manage earnings aggressively, before the manipulations lead to costly external consequences.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 60
Keywords: Management turnover, earnings management, corporate governance
JEL Classification: G38, K22, K42, M41Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: March 22, 2010 ; Last revised: January 15, 2013
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