Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1573327
 
 

References (82)



 


 



The Agency Costs of Managerial Indiscretions: Sex, Lies, and Firm Value


Brandon N. Cline


Mississippi State University

Ralph A. Walkling


Drexel University - Lebow College of Business

Adam S. Yore


University of Missouri at Columbia - Department of Finance

March 9, 2016


Abstract:     
Personal managerial indiscretions are separate from a firm’s business activities but indicate the integrity of an executive. Consequently, they are important signals of trust to a firm’s counterparties. We find that the accused executives’ companies experience significant wealth deterioration, reduced operating margins, and lost business partners. Indiscretions are also associated with an increased probability of unrelated shareholder-initiated lawsuits, DOJ/SEC investigations, and managed earnings. We further find that CEOs and boards face labor market consequences, including forced turnover, pay cuts or lower shareholder votes at reelection. Indiscretions are more likely in poorly governed firms where disciplinary turnover is less likely.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 65

Keywords: managerial indiscretions, management quality, integrity, class action lawsuits, fraud, earnings management, corporate governance, managerial labor markets, director elections, CEO turnover

JEL Classification: G34, G39, K42


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Date posted: March 17, 2010 ; Last revised: March 10, 2016

Suggested Citation

Cline, Brandon N. and Walkling, Ralph A. and Yore, Adam S., The Agency Costs of Managerial Indiscretions: Sex, Lies, and Firm Value (March 9, 2016). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1573327 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1573327

Contact Information

Brandon N. Cline
Mississippi State University ( email )
Mississippi State, MS 39762
United States
662.325.7477 (Phone)
662.325.1977 (Fax)
Ralph August Walkling
Drexel University - Lebow College of Business ( email )
LeBow College of Business
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
(215) 895-4920 (Phone)
(215) 895-6119 (Fax)
Adam S. Yore (Contact Author)
University of Missouri at Columbia - Department of Finance ( email )
403 Cornell Hall
Columbia, MO 65211
United States
573-884-1446 (Phone)
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