Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1573426
 
 

References (7)



 


 



Vertical Merger, Collusion, and Disruptive Buyers


Volker Nocke


Department of Economics, University of Mannheim

Lucy White


Harvard Business School - Finance Unit; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

March 2010

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7722

Abstract:     
In a repeated game setting of a vertically related industry, we study the collusive effects of vertical mergers. We show that any vertical merger facilitates upstream collusion, no matter how large (in terms of capacity or size of product portfolio) the integrated downstream buyer. But a vertical merger with a larger buyer helps more to facilitate upstream collusion than a similar merger with a smaller buyer. This formalizes the idea expressed in the U.S. and EU non-horizontal merger guidelines that some downstream buyers may be more "disruptive" of collusive schemes than others.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 22

Keywords: antitrust, collusion, merger guidelines, vertical integration, vertical merger

JEL Classification: L13, L40

working papers series





Date posted: March 17, 2010  

Suggested Citation

Nocke, Volker and White, Lucy, Vertical Merger, Collusion, and Disruptive Buyers (March 2010). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7722. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1573426

Contact Information

Volker Nocke
Department of Economics, University of Mannheim ( email )
D-68131 Mannheim
Germany
HOME PAGE: http://nocke.vwl.uni-mannheim.de
Lucy White
Harvard Business School - Finance Unit ( email )
Boston, MA 02163
United States
617-495-0645 (Phone)
617-496-3564 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://pine.hbs.edu/external/facPersonalShow.do?email=lwhite
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
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