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Regulatory Reform after the Crisis: Opportunities and Pitfalls

Thorsten Beck

City University London - Sir John Cass Business School; Tilburg University - European Banking Center, CentER

March 2010

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7733

The recent crisis has led to a thriving academic and policy debate on the future regulation of financial institutions and markets. This paper argues that the objective of securing financial stability should be balanced with the goal of fostering financial deepening and efficiency, especially in emerging markets. This would require a market-harnessing rather than market-restricting approach to regulation; it would imply price-based capital and liquidity regulation, rather than restrictions and prohibitions; it would focus on forcing financial institutions to internalize the external costs of their risk-taking decisions rather than suppressing financial innovation. Beyond changes in the capital and liquidity requirements and corporate governance structures, the overhaul of failure resolution systems should top the reform agenda, to better address incentives problems and impose market discipline, even on large, too-important-to-close financial institutions. Reform areas should include both legal and regulatory frameworks and incentive structures for regulators and supervisors.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 31

Keywords: Bank regulation, Financial crisis

JEL Classification: G18, G28

Date posted: March 17, 2010  

Suggested Citation

Beck, Thorsten, Regulatory Reform after the Crisis: Opportunities and Pitfalls (March 2010). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7733. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1573437

Contact Information

Thorsten Beck (Contact Author)
City University London - Sir John Cass Business School ( email )
106 Bunhill Row
London, EC1Y 8TZ
United Kingdom
Tilburg University - European Banking Center, CentER ( email )
PO Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Feedback to SSRN

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