Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1573694
 
 

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Individual and Corporate Social Responsibility


Jean Tirole


University of Toulouse 1 - Industrial Economic Institute (IDEI); University of Toulouse 1 - Groupe de Recherche en Economie Mathématique et Quantitative (GREMAQ); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Roland Bénabou


Princeton University - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

March 17, 2010

FEEM Working Paper No. 23.2010

Abstract:     
Society’s demands for individual and corporate social responsibility as an alternative response to market and distributive failures are becoming increasingly prominent. We first draw on recent developments in the “psychology and economics” of prosocial behavior to shed light on this trend, which reflects a complex interplay of genuine altruism, social or self image concerns, and material incentives. We then link individual concerns to corporate social responsibility, contrasting three possible understandings of the term: the adoption of a more long-term perspective by firms, the delegated exercise of prosocial behavior on behalf of stakeholders, and insider-initiated corporate philanthropy. For both individuals and firms we discuss the benefits, costs and limits of socially responsible behavior as a means to further societal goals.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 29

Keywords: Corporate Social Responsibility, Socially Responsible Investment, Image Concerns, Shareholder Value

JEL Classification: D64, D78, H41, L31

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Date posted: March 26, 2010  

Suggested Citation

Tirole, Jean and Bénabou, Roland, Individual and Corporate Social Responsibility (March 17, 2010). FEEM Working Paper No. 23.2010. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1573694 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1573694

Contact Information

Jean Tirole (Contact Author)
University of Toulouse 1 - Industrial Economic Institute (IDEI) ( email )
Place Anatole France
21 Allees de Brienne
F-31042 Toulouse Cedex
France
+33 5 61 12 8642 (Phone)
+33 5 61 12 8637 (Fax)
University of Toulouse 1 - Groupe de Recherche en Economie Mathématique et Quantitative (GREMAQ) ( email )
Manufacture des Tabacs
21 Allees de Brienne
Toulouse, 31000
France
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Roland Bénabou
Princeton University - Department of Economics ( email )
Robertson Hall, 440
Princeton, NJ 08544
United States
609-258-3672 (Phone)
609-258-5533 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
212-998-8939 (Phone)
212-995-4186 (Fax)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany
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References:  50
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