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How Does Voice Matter? Evidence from the Ultimatum Game


Qiyan Ong


Nanyang Technological University (NTU) - Division of Economics

Yohanes E. Riyanto


Nanyang Technological University (NTU) - Division of Economics

Steven M. Sheffrin


Tulane University

October 9, 2011


Abstract:     
Prior research has demonstrated that the ability to express one’s views or “voice” matters in social and economic interactions, but little is known of the mechanisms through which voice operates. Using an experimental approach based on the ultimatum game with the strategy method, we explore four potential channels for voice that encompass and expand on prior work: the knowledge effect of voice, the value expressive (or inherent value) of voice, the expectation effect of voice, and the procedural fairness effects of voice. Our results show strong effects through the value expressive and expectation channel, but not through either the knowledge channel or procedural fairness. In our view, voice is powerful because people like to express their views and they are disappointed when their views did not make a difference in their outcomes.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 24

Keywords: voice, ultimatum game

JEL Classification: D30, C91

working papers series


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Date posted: March 23, 2010 ; Last revised: October 16, 2011

Suggested Citation

Ong, Qiyan, Riyanto, Yohanes E. and Sheffrin, Steven M., How Does Voice Matter? Evidence from the Ultimatum Game (October 9, 2011). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1573979 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1573979

Contact Information

Qiyan Ong (Contact Author)
Nanyang Technological University (NTU) - Division of Economics ( email )
HSS 04-53, 14 Nanyang Drive
Singapore, 639798
Singapore
Yohanes E. Riyanto
Nanyang Technological University (NTU) - Division of Economics ( email )
HSS 04-53, 14 Nanyang Drive
Singapore, 639798
Singapore
Steven Mark Sheffrin
Tulane University ( email )
New Orleans, LA 70118
United States
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