Europe and the Constitution: What If this is as Good as it Gets?

Abstract

In this essay, I argue that national constitutionalism is simply a contextual representation of constitutionalism whose dated and artificial borders are challenged by European constitutionalism. In themselves, constitutional ideals are not dependent nor legitimised by the borders of national polities. As a consequence, there is often no a priori claim of higher validity for national constitutionalism vis-àvis European constitutionalism. My first objective at this point is to question the artificial supremacy of national constitutionalism and argue for a new form of constitutionalism. At the same time, I believe it will be possible to derive from a new analysis of constitutionalism a form of legitimation for the European Union arising from its constitutional and democratic added value in facing the present atomisation and deteritorialisation of normative power. The deconstruction of constitutionalism required by European integration may actually promote an extended application of its ideals. We will see that, in many respects, the problems of the European Constitution are simply reflections of the limits of national constitutionalism that we have for long ignored.

Keywords: EU Law, European Constitution