Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1577296
 
 

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Presidential Values in Parliamentary Democracies


Richard Albert


Boston College - Law School

March 23, 2010

International Journal of Constitutional Law, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2010
Boston College Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 194

Abstract:     
Constitutional theory has long regarded the separation of powers as unique to presidential systems and incompatible with parliamentary ones. In this Article, I suggest that the core values of the separation of powers are achievable in both presidential and parliamentary systems, contrary to the conventional wisdom which insists that the separation of powers is the exclusive province of presidentialism. This conclusion – that parliamentary and presidential systems are comparably receptive to the practical and philosophical strictures of the separation of powers – unlocks interesting possibilities for rethinking constitutional structure anew.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 30

Keywords: Constitutional Theory, Constitutional Design, Separation of Powers, Parliamentarism, Presidentialism, Comparative Constitutional Structure

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Date posted: March 26, 2010 ; Last revised: November 3, 2013

Suggested Citation

Albert, Richard, Presidential Values in Parliamentary Democracies (March 23, 2010). International Journal of Constitutional Law, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2010 ; Boston College Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 194. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1577296

Contact Information

Richard Albert (Contact Author)
Boston College - Law School ( email )
885 Centre Street
Boston, MA 02459-1163
United States
617.552.3930 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://richardalbert.com

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