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Crowdfunding: Tapping the Right Crowd


Paul Belleflamme


CORE and Louvain School of Management, UCL (Université Catholique de Louvain); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

Thomas Lambert


Université catholique de Louvain - Department of Finance

Armin Schwienbacher


Univ. Lille Nord de France - SKEMA Business School

April 25, 2012

CORE Discussion Paper No. 2011/32

Abstract:     
The basic idea of crowdfunding is for an entrepreneur to raise external fi nance from a large audience (the "crowd"), where each individual provides a very small amount, instead of soliciting a small group of sophisticated investors. The entrepreneur uses her social networks and established platforms on the Internet to directly interact with the crowd. The paper compares two diff erent forms of crowdfunding: individuals are off ered either to pre-order the product, or to advance a fi xed amount of money in exchange for a share of future profi ts. In either case, "crowdfunders" are rewarded by "community benefi ts" that increase their utility. Using a unifi ed model, we show that the entrepreneur prefers pre-ordering if the initial capital requirement is relatively small, and profit-sharing otherwise. Our conclusions have implications for managerial decisions in the early development stage of firms, since the entrepreneur needs to build a community of individuals with whom she must interact.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 34

Keywords: crowdfunding, strategic fundraising, social environment, ties formation, pre-ordering, pro fit-sharing

JEL Classification: G32, L11, L13, L15, L21

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Date posted: March 30, 2010 ; Last revised: May 2, 2012

Suggested Citation

Belleflamme, Paul, Lambert, Thomas and Schwienbacher, Armin, Crowdfunding: Tapping the Right Crowd (April 25, 2012). CORE Discussion Paper No. 2011/32. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1578175 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1578175

Contact Information

Paul Belleflamme
CORE and Louvain School of Management, UCL (Université Catholique de Louvain) ( email )
34 Voie du Roman Pays
B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, b-1348
Belgium
+32 10 47 82 91 (Phone)
+32 10 47 43 01 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.core.ucl.ac.be/~belleflamme/
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany
Thomas Lambert
Université catholique de Louvain - Department of Finance ( email )
1 place des Doyens
B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve
Belgium
Armin Schwienbacher (Contact Author)
Univ. Lille Nord de France - SKEMA Business School ( email )
Lille
France
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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