Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1581816
 
 

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CEO Incentives - It's Not How Much You Pay, But How


Michael C. Jensen


Harvard Business School; Social Science Electronic Publishing (SSEP), Inc.; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Kevin J. Murphy


University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business; University of Southern California - Department of Economics; USC Gould School of Law


Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Vol. 22, No. 1, pp. 64-76, Winter 2010

Abstract:     
In this 1990 Harvard Business Review classic, the authors begin by correcting a number of widespread misconceptions:

• Contrary to headlines at the time, top executives at the end of the 1980s were not receiving record salaries and bonuses. Instead they were catching up to real levels of pay that prevailed during the 1930s and had dropped sharply since then.

• Annual changes in executive compensation during the 1970s and 1980s were largely unrelated to changes in corporate performance, with CEO total compensation varying by only about $3 with every $1,000 change in shareholder wealth. (And the variability of total CEO pay was no higher than that of the compensation of hourly and salaried employees.)

• With respect to pay for performance, U.S. compensation practices in the ’70s and ’80s were getting worse rather than better over time. The percentage of stock ownership by CEOs in large public companies was ten times greater in the 1930s than in the 1980s. And during the previous 15 years (1975–1989), CEO holdings as a fraction of value had actually fallen.

With the aim of reversing these trends, the authors offered three recommendations:

• Substantial equity ownership by CEOs.

• Structuring of cash compensation to provide big rewards for outstanding performance and meaningful penalties for poor performance.

• Increased threat of dismissal for poor performance.

Since publication of this article in 1990, the first and third of these goals have largely been accomplished (while the second has proved more elusive).

Number of Pages in PDF File: 15

Accepted Paper Series


Date posted: March 31, 2010  

Suggested Citation

Jensen, Michael C. and Murphy, Kevin J., CEO Incentives - It's Not How Much You Pay, But How. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Vol. 22, No. 1, pp. 64-76, Winter 2010. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1581816 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-6622.2010.00262.x

Contact Information

Michael C. Jensen (Contact Author)
Harvard Business School ( email )
Soldiers Field
Negotiations, Organizations & Markets
Boston, MA 02163
United States
617-510-3363 (Phone)
305-675-3166 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://drfd.hbs.edu/fit/public/facultyInfo.do?facInfo=ovr&facId=6484
Social Science Electronic Publishing (SSEP), Inc. ( email )
7858 Sanderling Road
Sarasota, FL 34242
United States
617-510-3363 (Phone)
305 675-3166 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://ssrn.com/author=9

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
Kevin J. Murphy
University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business ( email )
BRI 308, MC 0804
Los Angeles, CA 90089-0804
United States
213-740-6553 (Phone)
213-740-6650 (Fax)

University of Southern California - Department of Economics
3620 South Vermont Ave. Kaprielian (KAP) Hall, 300
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States
USC Gould School of Law
699 Exposition Boulevard
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States

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