Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1582296
 
 

References (95)



 


 



Government Intervention in the Housing Market: Who Wins, Who Loses?


Max Floetotto


Stanford University

Michael Kirker


University of Chicago - Department of Economics

Johannes Stroebel


New York University (NYU); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

December 20, 2015


Abstract:     
We study the effects of government interventions in the U.S. housing market on prices, quantities, allocations, and welfare in a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents. We consider (i) the introduction of temporary home purchase tax credits and (ii) a removal of the asymmetric tax treatment of owner-occupied and rental housing. Homebuyer tax credits temporarily raise house prices and transaction volumes, but have negative effects on welfare. Removing the asymmetric tax treatment of owner-occupied and rental housing can generate welfare gains for a majority of agents in a comparison of steady states. Welfare impacts are more varied along the transition between steady states, which affects the desirability of the policies.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 50

Keywords: Housing Market, Mortgage Interest Deductibility, Imputed Rents, Home Purchase Tax Credits, Policy Evaluation, Transition between Steady States

JEL Classification: C6, E21, E6, H21, R21


Open PDF in Browser Download This Paper

Date posted: April 2, 2010 ; Last revised: December 24, 2015

Suggested Citation

Floetotto, Max and Kirker, Michael and Stroebel, Johannes, Government Intervention in the Housing Market: Who Wins, Who Loses? (December 20, 2015). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1582296 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1582296

Contact Information

Max Floetotto
Stanford University ( email )
Stanford, CA 94305
United States
HOME PAGE: http://www.stanford.edu/~maxf
Michael Kirker
University of Chicago - Department of Economics ( email )
1126 East 59th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
HOME PAGE: http://michaelkirker.net
Johannes Stroebel (Contact Author)
New York University (NYU) ( email )
Bobst Library, E-resource Acquisitions
20 Cooper Square 3rd Floor
New York, NY 10003-711
United States
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 2,226
Downloads: 308
Download Rank: 67,025
References:  95
People who downloaded this paper also downloaded:
1. House Prices, Local Demand, and Retail Prices
By Johannes Stroebel and Joseph Vavra

© 2016 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollobot1 in 2.703 seconds