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Net Neutrality Regulation: The Economic EvidenceJerry BritoMercatus Center at George Mason University Martin E. CaveUniversity of Warwick - Warwick Business School; Brunel University Robert W. CrandallBrookings Institution; AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies Larry F. DarbyThe American Consumer Institute Everett EhrlichESC Company Jeffrey A. EisenachNavigant Economics LLC; George Mason University School of Law Jerry ElligGeorge Mason University - Mercatus Center Henry ErgasSMART Infrastructure Facility David J. FarberCarnegie Mellon University - School of Computer Science Gerald R. FaulhaberUniversity of Pennsylvania - Wharton School Robert W. HahnUniversity of Oxford, Smith School; Georgetown University Alfred E. KahnDeceased - National Economic Research Associates Inc. (NERA) Wayne A. LeightonFrancisco Marroquin University Robert E. LitanEwing Marion Kauffman Foundation; AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies Glen O. RobinsonUniversity of Virginia School of Law Hal J. SingerNavigant Economics LLC Vernon L. SmithChapman University - Economic Science Institute; Chapman University School of Law William E. Taylor IIIMarsh & McLennan Companies - Cambridge Office Timothy J. TardiffAdvanced Analytical Consulting Group Leonard WavermanLondon Business School Dennis WeismanKansas State University - Department of Economics April 12, 2010 Abstract: In the authors' shared opinion, the economic evidence does not support the regulations proposed in the Commission’s Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Regarding Preserving the Open Internet and Broadband Industry Practices (the “NPRM”). To the contrary, the economic evidence provides no support for the existence of market failure sufficient to warrant ex ante regulation of the type proposed by the Commission, and strongly suggests that the regulations, if adopted, would reduce consumer welfare in both the short and long run. To the extent the types of conduct addressed in the NPRM may, in isolated circumstances, have the potential to harm competition or consumers, the Commission and other regulatory bodies have the ability to deter or prohibit such conduct on a case-by-case basis, through the application of existing doctrines and procedures. Hence, the approach advocated in the NPRM is not necessary to achieve whatever economic benefits may be associated with prohibiting harmful discrimination on the Internet.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 32 Keywords: net neutrality, FCC, Internet, broadband, regulation working papers seriesDate posted: April 10, 2010 ; Last revised: April 21, 2013Suggested CitationContact Information
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