Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1587058
 
 

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Net Neutrality Regulation: The Economic Evidence


Jerry Brito


George Mason University - Mercatus Center

Martin E. Cave


University of Warwick - Warwick Business School; Brunel University

Robert W. Crandall


Brookings Institution; AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies

Larry F. Darby


The American Consumer Institute

Everett Ehrlich


ESC Company

Jeffrey A. Eisenach


American Enterprise Institute

Jerry Ellig


George Mason University - Mercatus Center

Henry Ergas


University of Wollongong - SMART Infrastructure Facility; Deloitte Access Economics

David J. Farber


Carnegie Mellon University - School of Computer Science

Gerald R. Faulhaber


University of Pennsylvania - Wharton School

Robert W. Hahn


University of Oxford, Smith School; Georgetown University

Alfred E. Kahn


Deceased - National Economic Research Associates Inc. (NERA)

Wayne A. Leighton


Francisco Marroquin University

Robert E. Litan


Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation; AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies

Glen O. Robinson


University of Virginia School of Law

Hal J. Singer


Economists Incorporated

Vernon L. Smith


Chapman University - Economic Science Institute; Chapman University School of Law

William E. Taylor III


Marsh & McLennan Companies - Cambridge Office

Timothy J. Tardiff


Advanced Analytical Consulting Group

Leonard Waverman


London Business School

Dennis Weisman


Kansas State University - Department of Economics

April 12, 2010


Abstract:     
In the authors' shared opinion, the economic evidence does not support the regulations proposed in the Commission’s Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Regarding Preserving the Open Internet and Broadband Industry Practices (the “NPRM”). To the contrary, the economic evidence provides no support for the existence of market failure sufficient to warrant ex ante regulation of the type proposed by the Commission, and strongly suggests that the regulations, if adopted, would reduce consumer welfare in both the short and long run. To the extent the types of conduct addressed in the NPRM may, in isolated circumstances, have the potential to harm competition or consumers, the Commission and other regulatory bodies have the ability to deter or prohibit such conduct on a case-by-case basis, through the application of existing doctrines and procedures. Hence, the approach advocated in the NPRM is not necessary to achieve whatever economic benefits may be associated with prohibiting harmful discrimination on the Internet.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 32

Keywords: net neutrality, FCC, Internet, broadband, regulation

working papers series


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Date posted: April 10, 2010 ; Last revised: April 21, 2013

Suggested Citation

Brito, Jerry and Cave, Martin E. and Crandall, Robert W. and Darby, Larry F. and Ehrlich, Everett and Eisenach, Jeffrey A. and Ellig, Jerry and Ergas, Henry and Farber, David J. and Faulhaber, Gerald R. and Hahn, Robert W. and Kahn, Alfred E. and Leighton, Wayne A. and Litan, Robert E. and Robinson, Glen O. and Singer, Hal J. and Smith, Vernon L. and Taylor, William E. and Tardiff, Timothy J. and Waverman, Leonard and Weisman, Dennis, Net Neutrality Regulation: The Economic Evidence (April 12, 2010). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1587058 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1587058

Contact Information

Jerry Brito
George Mason University - Mercatus Center ( email )
3301 N. Fairfax Dr.
Ste. 450
Arlington, VA 22201-4433
United States
HOME PAGE: http://www.mercatus.org
Martin E. Cave
University of Warwick - Warwick Business School ( email )
Centre for Management under Regulation (CMuR)
Coventry CV4 7AL
United Kingdom
Brunel University
Uxbridge
Uxbridge, Middlesex, Middlesex UB8 3PH
United Kingdom
Robert Crandall
Brookings Institution ( email )
1775 Massachusetts Ave. NW
Washington, DC 20036-2188
United States
202-797-6291 (Phone)
202-797-6181 (Fax)
AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies
1150 17th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036
United States
Larry F. Darby
The American Consumer Institute ( email )
1701 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Suite 300
Washington, DC 20006
United States
Everett Ehrlich
ESC Company ( email )
Washington, DC
United States
Jeffrey A. Eisenach (Contact Author)
American Enterprise Institute ( email )
1150 17th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036
United States
Jerry Ellig
George Mason University - Mercatus Center ( email )
3434 Washington Blvd
4th Floor
Arlington, VA 22201-4433
United States
703-375-9410 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://mercatus.org/jerry-ellig
Henry Ergas
University of Wollongong - SMART Infrastructure Facility ( email )
Northfields Avenue
Wollongong, New South Wales 2500
Australia
Deloitte Access Economics ( email )
9 Sydney Avenue
Barton
Canberra, Kingston 2600
Australia
David J. Farber
Carnegie Mellon University - School of Computer Science ( email )
5000 Forbes Avenue
Pittsburgh, PA 15213
United States
Gerald R. Faulhaber
University of Pennsylvania - Wharton School ( email )
Steinberg-Dietrich Hall
Suite 1400
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6372
United States
215-898-7860 (Phone)

Robert W. Hahn
University of Oxford, Smith School ( email )
Oxford
United Kingdom
Georgetown University
Georgetown Center for Business and Public Policy
Washington, DC 20057
United States
Alfred E. Kahn
Deceased - National Economic Research Associates Inc. (NERA)
N/A
Wayne A. Leighton
Francisco Marroquin University ( email )
6 calle final, zona 10
Guatemala City, 01010
Guatemala
Robert E. Litan
Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation ( email )
4801 Rockhill Road
Kansas City, MO 64110
United States
AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies
1150 17th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036
United States
Glen O. Robinson
University of Virginia School of Law ( email )
580 Massie Road
Charlottesville, VA 22903
United States
(434) 924-3621 (Phone)
Hal J. Singer
Economists Incorporated ( email )
2121 K Street N.W.
Suite 1100
Washington, DC 20037
United States
202-747-3520 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.ei.com/viewprofessional.php?id=71
Vernon L. Smith
Chapman University - Economic Science Institute ( email )
One University Dr.
Orange, CA 92866
United States
714-628-2830 (Phone)
Chapman University School of Law ( email )
One University Drive
Orange, CA 92866-1099
United States
William E. Taylor III
Marsh & McLennan Companies - Cambridge Office ( email )
One Main Street, 5th Floor
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States
617-621-2615 (Phone)
Timothy J. Tardiff
Advanced Analytical Consulting Group ( email )
211 Congress Street
Boston, MA 02110
United States
Leonard Waverman
London Business School ( email )
Sussex Place
Regent's Park
London, London NW1 4SA
United Kingdom
Dennis Weisman
Kansas State University - Department of Economics ( email )
Manhattan, KS 66502-4001
United States
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