Abstract

  


 



Jump Bidding in Takeover Auctions


Anna Dodonova


University of Ottawa - Telfer School of Management

Yuri Khoroshilov


University of Ottawa, Telfer School of Management
March 1, 2006

Economics Letters, Vol. 92, pp. 339-341, 2006

Abstract:     
This paper shows that the target’s ability to reject the highest offer makes bidders unwilling to reveal their private signals. In particular, such ability precludes bidders from using jump bidding to signal their high values to deter competition. This paper appeals for an alternative explanation of the existence of jump bidding in takeover auctions.

Keywords: Auction, Takeover

JEL Classification: C72, G34

Accepted Paper Series


Date posted: April 10, 2010  

Suggested Citation

Dodonova, Anna and Khoroshilov, Yuri, Jump Bidding in Takeover Auctions (March 1, 2006). Economics Letters, Vol. 92, pp. 339-341, 2006. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1587403

Contact Information

Anna Dodonova
University of Ottawa - Telfer School of Management ( email )
136 Jean-Jacques Lussier Street
Ottawa, Ontario K1N 6N5
Canada
(613) 562 5800 + 4912 (Phone)
Yuri Khoroshilov (Contact Author)
University of Ottawa, Telfer School of Management ( email )
55 E. Laurier
Ottawa, Ontario K1N 6N5
Canada
613-562-5800, ext. 4768 (Phone)
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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