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http://ssrn.com/abstract=1588947
 
 

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Deutsche Telekom and Pacific Bell v. Linkline: Does a Regulatory Obligation to Deal Suffice to Establish a Price Squeeze? And does Competition Law have a Place in Regulated Industries?


Martin Holterman


European University Institute - Florence School of Regulation

April 13, 2010


Abstract:     
In two recent cases, the Supreme Court of the United States and the Court of First Instance of the European Communities gave very different answers to the question of how much involvement the competition authorities should have in the telecom industry. This paper takes those cases as a starting point to examine their legal reasoning, focusing on the question of whether those results were required by the substantive competition laws, and whether they make sense from the point of view of economic science. Subsequently, an attempt is made to model the costs and benefits of having more than one government agency supervise the same industry.

The results show that the rulings of each court are consistent with the well known trends in competition law, resulting in a more interventionist European approach contrasted with an American result that rules out certain theories of liability that are, economically speaking, undoubtedly meritorious. The model that is proposed to consider the uncertainties involved in regulating a high-innovation industry offers a framework for thinking about such matters without – for now – allowing specific recommendations for either Europe or the US.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 29

Keywords: Competition Law, Telecom Regulation

JEL Classification: D72, D81, K21, K42

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Date posted: April 13, 2010 ; Last revised: June 19, 2011

Suggested Citation

Holterman, Martin, Deutsche Telekom and Pacific Bell v. Linkline: Does a Regulatory Obligation to Deal Suffice to Establish a Price Squeeze? And does Competition Law have a Place in Regulated Industries? (April 13, 2010). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1588947 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1588947

Contact Information

Martin Holterman (Contact Author)
European University Institute - Florence School of Regulation ( email )
Florence
Italy
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