Abstract

  
 

References (23)



 
 

Citations (1)



 


 



Asymmetric Information and List Price Reductions in the Housing Market


Erik R. De Wit


University of Amsterdam - Finance Group; Tinbergen Institute

Bas Van der Klaauw


VU University Amsterdam - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA); Tinbergen Institute
April 10, 2010

Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 10-038/3

Abstract:     
In housing markets with asymmetric information list prices may signal unobserved properties of the house or the seller. Asymmetric information is the starting point of many models for the housing market. In this paper, we estimate the causal effect of list-price reductions to test for the presence of asymmetric information. We use very rich and extensive administrative data from the Netherlands. Our empirical results show that list-price reductions significantly increase the probability of selling a house, but also the rate of withdrawal from the market increases.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 29

Keywords: Time-On-The-Market, Duration Analysis, Transaction Prices, Selectivity

JEL Classification: C41, D82, R21, R31

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: April 15, 2010  

Suggested Citation

De Wit, Erik R. and Van der Klaauw, Bas, Asymmetric Information and List Price Reductions in the Housing Market (April 10, 2010). Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 10-038/3. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1589295 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1589295

Contact Information

Erik R. De Wit (Contact Author)
University of Amsterdam - Finance Group ( email )
Roetersstraat 11
1018 WB Amsterdam
Netherlands
+31205255414 (Phone)
+31205255285 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.abs.uva.nl/pp/edewit
Tinbergen Institute
Gustav Mahlerplein 117
Amsterdam, 1082 MS
Netherlands
HOME PAGE: http://www.tinbergen.nl
Bas Van der Klaauw
VU University Amsterdam - Department of Economics ( email )
De Boelelaan 1105
1081 HV Amsterdam
Netherlands
+31 20 444 6120 (Phone)
+31 20 444 6005 (Fax)
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany
Tinbergen Institute
Burg. Oudlaan 50
Rotterdam, 3062 PA
Netherlands
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 340
Downloads: 50
References:  23
Citations:  1

© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright
This page was processed by apollo3 in 0.391 seconds