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Learning and the Disappearing Association Between Governance and ReturnsLucian A. BebchukHarvard Law School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) Alma CohenTel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics; Harvard Law School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Charles C. Y. WangHarvard Business School June 1, 2011 Journal of Financial Economics, Forthcoming Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 667 Abstract: During the period 1991-1999, stock returns were correlated with the G-Index based on twenty-four governance provisions (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003)) and the E-Index based on the six provisions that matter most (Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009)). This correlation, however, did not persist during the subsequent period 2000-2008. We provide evidence that both the identified correlation and its subsequent disappearance were due to market participants’ gradually learning to appreciate the difference between firms scoring well and poorly on the governance indices. Consistent with the learning hypothesis, we find that: (i) The disappearance of the governance-return correlation was associated with an increase in the attention to governance by a wide range of market participants; (ii) Until the beginning of the 2000s, but not subsequently, stock market reactions to earning announcements reflected the market’s being more positively surprised by the earning announcements of good-governance firms than by those of poor-governance firms; (iii) Stock analysts were also more positively surprised by the earning announcements of good-governance firms than by those of poor-governance firms until the beginning of the 2000s but not afterwards; (iv) While the G-Index and E-Index could no longer generate abnormal returns in the 2000s, their negative association with Tobin’s Q and operating performance persisted; and (v) The existence and subsequent disappearance of the governance-return correlation cannot be fully explained by additional common risk factors suggested in the literature for augmenting the Fame-French-Carhart four-factor model. ___________________________________ Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) is available on SSRN at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=278920 Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) is available on SSRN at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=593423
Number of Pages in PDF File: 56 Keywords: Corporate governance, governance indices, GIM, G-Index, E-Index, shareholder rights, entrenchment, market efficiency, learning, earning announcements, analyst forecasts, IRRC provisions, behavioral finance, asset pricing JEL Classification: D03, G10, G12, G30, G34, K22 Accepted Paper SeriesDate posted: April 14, 2010 ; Last revised: September 27, 2012Suggested CitationContact Information
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