Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=158988
 


 



Welfare Effects of Timely Reporting


Mitchell A. Farlee


University of British Columbia (UBC) - Sauder School of Business


Review of Accounting Studies, Vol 3, 1998

Abstract:     
A principal-agent model is examined in which a manager acquires private cost information sequentially. All possible communication schemes are equivalent to one of two: (1) timely reporting, where the manager reports as soon as possible, and (2) delayed reporting, where the manager delays the report of the first of two signals. In the primary case identified, timely reporting is shown to be "owner valuable." However, the manager is better off under delayed reporting. Finally, total expected surplus is shown greater under delayed reporting. The owners' benefit from timely reporting is less than the manager's loss.

JEL Classification: M40, M46, D82

Accepted Paper Series


Not Available For Download

Date posted: April 27, 1999  

Suggested Citation

Farlee, Mitchell A., Welfare Effects of Timely Reporting. Review of Accounting Studies, Vol 3, 1998. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=158988

Contact Information

Mitchell A. Farlee (Contact Author)
University of British Columbia (UBC) - Sauder School of Business ( email )
2053 Main Mall
Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z2
Canada
604-822-8528 (Phone)
604-822-9470 (Fax)
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