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Regulatory Capital Charges for Too-Connected-To-Fail Institutions: A Practical Proposal


Jorge A. Chan-Lau


International Monetary Fund (IMF) - International Capital Markets Department; Tufts University - Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy

April 2010

IMF Working Paper No. 10/98

Abstract:     
The recent financial crisis has highlighted once more that interconnectedness in the financial system is a major source of systemic risk. I suggest a practical way to levy regulatory capital charges based on the degree of interconnectedness among financial institutions. Namely, the charges are based on the institution’s incremental contribution to systemic risk. The imposition of such capital charges could go a long way towards internalizing the negative externalities associated with too-connected-to-fail institutions and providing managerial incentives to strengthen an institution’s solvency position, and avoid too much homogeneity and excessive reliance on the same counterparties in the financial industry.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 26

Keywords: Bank regulations, Banking sector, Capital, Credit risk, Financial crisis, Financial institutions, Financial risk, Financial stability, Global Financial Crisis 2008-2009, Globalization, International financial system

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Date posted: April 19, 2010  

Suggested Citation

Chan-Lau, Jorge A., Regulatory Capital Charges for Too-Connected-To-Fail Institutions: A Practical Proposal (April 2010). IMF Working Papers, Vol. , pp. 1-25, 2010. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1590711

Contact Information

Jorge Antonio Chan-Lau (Contact Author)
International Monetary Fund (IMF) - International Capital Markets Department ( email )
700 19th Street NW
Washington, DC 20431
United States
Tufts University - Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy ( email )
160 Packard Ave
Medford, MA 02155
United States
HOME PAGE: http://fletcher.tufts.edu/ceme/index.shtml
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