Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1591963
 
 

References (41)



 


 



Efficient, Fair, and Incomprehensible: How the State 'Sells' Its Judiciary


Keith J. Bybee


Syracuse University College of Law and Maxwell School

Heather Pincock


affiliation not provided to SSRN

April 18, 2010


Abstract:     
Sociolegal scholars often approach dispute resolution from the perspective of the disputants, emphasizing how the resources on each side shape the course of conflict. We suggest a different, “supply-side” perspective. Focusing on the state’s efforts to establish centralized courts in place of local justice systems, we consider the strategies that a supplier of dispute resolving services uses to attract disputes for resolution. We argue that state actors often attempt to “sell” centralized courts to potential litigants by insisting that the state’s services are more efficient and fair than local courts operating outside direct state control. Moreover, we argue that state actors also invest significant energy in claiming that the local courts are incomprehensible. Thus, in its efforts to introduce and advance centralized courts, the state argues not only that it offers the best version of what the citizenry wants, but also that it is impossible to conceive that people would want something other than what the state offers. We illustrate our argument and explain its significance by examining judicial reform in New York, where there has been a decades-long effort to displace local justice systems.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 46

Keywords: Courts, Local Justice Systems, State Action, Dispute Resolution

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: April 19, 2010  

Suggested Citation

Bybee, Keith J. and Pincock, Heather, Efficient, Fair, and Incomprehensible: How the State 'Sells' Its Judiciary (April 18, 2010). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1591963 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1591963

Contact Information

Keith James Bybee (Contact Author)
Syracuse University College of Law and Maxwell School ( email )
321 Eggers Hall
Syracuse University
Syracuse, NY 13244-1030
United States
315-443-9743 (Phone)
Heather Pincock
affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 309
Downloads: 36
References:  41

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo1 in 1.765 seconds