Split or Steal? Cooperative Behavior When the Stakes Are Large
Martijn J. Van den Assem
VU University Amsterdam - Faculty of Economics and Business Administration
Dennie Van Dolder
Nottingham School of Economics - University of Nottingham
Richard H. Thaler
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
September 12, 2011
Management Science, Vol. 58, No. 1, pp. 2-20, January 2012
We examine cooperative behavior when large sums of money are at stake, using data from the TV game show “Golden Balls.” At the end of each episode, contestants play a variant on the classic Prisoner’s Dilemma for large and widely ranging stakes averaging over $20,000. Cooperation is surprisingly high for amounts that would normally be considered consequential but look tiny in their current context, what we call a “big peanuts” phenomenon. Utilizing the prior interaction among contestants, we find evidence that people have reciprocal preferences. Surprisingly, there is little support for conditional cooperation in our sample. That is, players do not seem to be more likely to cooperate if their opponent might be expected to cooperate. Further, we replicate earlier findings that males are less cooperative than females, but this gender effect reverses for older contestants because men become increasingly cooperative as their age increases.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 37
Keywords: natural experiment, game show, prisoner’s dilemma, cooperation, cooperative behavior, social behavior, social preferences, reciprocity, reciprocal behavior, context effects, anchoring
JEL Classification: C72, C93, D03
Date posted: April 19, 2010 ; Last revised: January 23, 2013
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