Preference Intensities and Risk Aversion in School Choice: A Laboratory Experiment
Harvard Business School
Technical University of Lisbon (UTL); UECE - Research Unit on Complexity in Economics
Fundacion de Estudios de Economıa Aplicada
April 19, 2010
Harvard Business School Research Paper Series # 10-093
We experimentally investigate in the laboratory two prominent mechanisms that are employed in school choice programs to assign students to public schools. We study how individual behavior is influenced by preference intensities and risk aversion. Our main results show that (a) the Gale–Shapley mechanism is more robust to changes in cardinal preferences than the Boston mechanism independently of whether individuals can submit a complete or only a restricted ranking of the schools and (b) subjects with a higher degree of risk aversion are more likely to play “safer” strategies under the Gale–Shapley but not under the Boston mechanism. Both results have important implications for the efficiency and the stability of the mechanisms.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 43
Keywords: school choice, risk aversion, preference intensities, laboratory experiment, Gale–Shapley mechanism, Boston mechanism, efficiency, stability, constrained choice
JEL Classification: C78, C91, C92, D78, I2working papers series
Date posted: April 20, 2010
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