Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1593334
 
 

Citations (3)



 


 



Challenge of International Cooperation and Institutional Design in Financial Supervision: Beyond Transgovernmental Networks


Eric J. Pan


U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission; Yeshiva University - Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law

April 20, 2010

Chicago Journal of International Law, Vol. 11, pp. 243-284, 2010
Cardozo Legal Studies Research Paper No. 300

Abstract:     
This paper explores the case for a global financial regulator. It first identifies two problems with how legal scholars viewed the international financial architecture before the financial crisis. International law scholars mistakenly thought that informal transgovernmental networks could serve as the heart of an international regulatory framework. In fact, the international financial architecture proved incapable of preventing or managing the causes and effects of the recent financial crisis. The reason why is the second problem. Financial law scholars did not speak out more strongly before the crisis about the limitations of the international financial architecture. They focused their attention on the coordination and harmonization of rules and standards in areas of accounting, securities, and bank capital adequacy, but did not resolve the problems of prudential supervision of cross-border financial institutions and systemic risk regulation. The failure of states to provide for an international legal regime capable of conducting prudential supervision of cross-border financial institutions proved to be one reason why the international financial architecture could not address the spread of financial instability.

This paper sets forth an international administrative law model for international financial regulation. It advocates the creation of an international body that has the power and resources to supervise cross-border financial institutions, demand action by national supervisors, promulgate supervisory standards, conduct inspections, and initiate enforcement proceedings. Acknowledging possible objections to an international administrative law model, particularly those related to the protection of state sovereignty and democratic accountability, this paper argues that an international administrative agency is the best solution to the problem of global financial regulation.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 42

Keywords: international finance, financial regulation, international administrative law, transgovernmental networks, prudential supervision, Basel

Accepted Paper Series





Download This Paper

Date posted: April 21, 2010 ; Last revised: August 13, 2010

Suggested Citation

Pan, Eric J., Challenge of International Cooperation and Institutional Design in Financial Supervision: Beyond Transgovernmental Networks (April 20, 2010). Chicago Journal of International Law, Vol. 11, pp. 243-284, 2010; Cardozo Legal Studies Research Paper No. 300. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1593334

Contact Information

Eric J. Pan (Contact Author)
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission ( email )
100 F Street, NE
Washington, DC 20549-1004
United States
202-551-4287 (Phone)
Yeshiva University - Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law ( email )
55 Fifth Avenue
New York, NY 10003
United States
212-790-0803 (Fax)
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 3,556
Downloads: 885
Download Rank: 14,084
Citations:  3

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo1 in 0.406 seconds