Antitrust Enforcement Under Endogenous Fines and Price-Dependent Detection Probabilities
VU University Amsterdam - Department of Econometrics; Tinbergen Institute
VU University Amsterdam - Department of Economics; TILEC
Vanderbilt University - College of Arts and Science - Department of Economics
April 21, 2010
TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2010-020
We analyze the effectiveness of antitrust regulation in a repeated oligopoly model in which both fines and detection probabilities depend on the cartel price. Such fines are closer to actual guidelines than the commonly assumed fixed fines. Under a constant detection probability, we confirm the long-run neutrality result with respect to fixed fines reported in Harrington (2005) and extend his result to the case where fines are directly proportional to illegal gains. In addition, we report that the profit-maximizing cartel price lies below the monopoly price when policy design features non-constant price-dependent detection probability. This offers partial support for current practice.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 13
Keywords: Repeated Game, Cartel, Antitrust, Competition Policy
JEL Classification: C72, L41, K21
Date posted: April 23, 2010
© 2015 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo3 in 0.265 seconds