Collusive Networks in Market-Sharing Agreements Under the Presence of an Antitrust Authority
Public-Private Sector Research Center, IESE Business
April 15, 2010
IESE Business School Working Paper No. 854
This article studies how the presence of an antitrust authority affects market-sharing agreements made by firms. These agreements prevent firms from entering each other's market. The set of these agreements defines a collusive network, which is pursued by antitrust authorities. This article shows that while in the absence of the antitrust authority, a network is stable if its alliances are large enough when considering the antitrust authority, and more competitive structures can be sustained through bilateral agreements. Antitrust laws may have a pro-competitive effect, as they give firms in large alliances more incentives to cut their agreements at once.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 34
Keywords: market-sharing, economic networks, antitrust authority, oligopoly
JEL Classification: D43, K21, L41working papers series
Date posted: April 21, 2010
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