Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1595091
 
 

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Controlling Executive Compensation – Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance: A Proposed Solution to Inflated Pay


Sharie-Ann J. Campbell


affiliation not provided to SSRN

April 5, 2010


Abstract:     
Discourse surrounding executive compensation has been ripe, yet no regulatory mechanism has been successful in controlling the two main features of executive compensation: salary and severance. Lack of convergence between compensation received by executives and their performance in managing the corporation creates detrimental inefficiencies. Directors’ and Officers’ liability insurance (D&O Insurance), currently addresses “the financial risk of malfeasance”, by shifting liability to an insurance company. By insuring against the severance packages of executives, Directors’ and Officers’ liability insurance can effectively control executive compensation.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 18

Keywords: D&O Insurance, Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance, Executive Compensation, CEO Pay

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Date posted: April 24, 2010  

Suggested Citation

Campbell, Sharie-Ann J., Controlling Executive Compensation – Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance: A Proposed Solution to Inflated Pay (April 5, 2010). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1595091 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1595091

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Sharie-Ann Jheanelle Campbell (Contact Author)
affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )
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