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Designing Antitrust Agencies for More Effective Outcomes: What Antitrust Can Learn from Restaurant Guides


D. Daniel Sokol


University of Florida - Levin College of Law; George Washington University Law School Competition Law Center

April 28, 2010

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal, Vol. 41, pp. 577-590, 2010
University of Florida Levin College of Law Research Paper No. 2010-11

Abstract:     
Antitrust policy should be concerned with the quality and effectiveness of the antitrust system. Some efforts at agency effectiveness include self-study of antitrust agencies to determine the factors that lead to improving agency quality. Such studies, however, often focus only on enforcement decisions and other agency initiatives such as competition advocacy. They do not reflect at least one other part of the equation: what do non-government users of the antitrust system think about the quality of antitrust agencies? This Symposium Essay advocates the use of a ratings guide by antitrust practitioners for antitrust agencies to add to the tools in which to measure agency effectiveness for both mature and emerging antitrust agencies.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 15

Keywords: antitrust, competition policy, institutions, economics, surveys

JEL Classification: K21, l4

working papers series


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Date posted: May 3, 2010 ; Last revised: June 14, 2010

Suggested Citation

Sokol, D. Daniel, Designing Antitrust Agencies for More Effective Outcomes: What Antitrust Can Learn from Restaurant Guides (April 28, 2010). Loyola University Chicago Law Journal, Vol. 41, pp. 577-590, 2010; University of Florida Levin College of Law Research Paper No. 2010-11. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1597115 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1597115

Contact Information

D. Daniel Sokol (Contact Author)
University of Florida - Levin College of Law ( email )
Spessard L. Holland Law Center
P.O. Box 117625
Gainesville, FL 32611-7625
United States
(352) 273-0968 (Phone)
(352) 392-3005 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.law.ufl.edu/faculty/d-daniel-sokol
George Washington University Law School Competition Law Center ( email )
200 H Street, NW
Washington, DC 20052
United States
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