Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1597325
 


 



Incomplete Contracts and Competition - Another Look at Fisher Body/General Motors?


Antonio Nicita


University of Siena - Department of Economics

Simone M. Sepe


University of Arizona - James E. Rogers College of Law; IAST - Fondation Jean-Jacques Laffont - TSE

2010

34 Eur. J. L. & Econ. 495 (2012)

Abstract:     
In this paper we analyze the problem of the enforcement of incomplete contracts with endogenous outside options. Some of the equilibria we outline may reverse one of the main results presented in the standard literature. We then revisit the literature on the highly debated Fisher Body/General Motors merger and suggest an explanation based on GM’s need to control the Fisher brothers’ outside options.

Keywords: incomplete contracts, competition, FIsher Body/General Motors

JEL Classification: D23, L12, L14, L21, L22, L42

Accepted Paper Series


Not Available For Download

Date posted: April 29, 2010 ; Last revised: February 7, 2013

Suggested Citation

Nicita, Antonio and Sepe, Simone M., Incomplete Contracts and Competition - Another Look at Fisher Body/General Motors? (2010). 34 Eur. J. L. & Econ. 495 (2012). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1597325

Contact Information

Antonio Nicita (Contact Author)
University of Siena - Department of Economics ( email )
Piazza S. Francesco, 7
Siena, I-53100
Italy
Simone M. Sepe
University of Arizona - James E. Rogers College of Law ( email )
P.O. Box 210176
Tucson, AZ 85721-0176
United States
IAST - Fondation Jean-Jacques Laffont - TSE ( email )
21 allée de Brienne
31015 Toulouse Cedex 6
Toulouse Cedex, F-31042
France
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