Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1599472
 


 



European Commission Decisions on Anti-Competitive Behavior


Jordi Gual


University of Navarra - IESE Business School; la Caixa; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Nuria Mas


University of Navarra, IESE Business School

March 3, 2010

IESE Business School Working Paper No. 846

Abstract:     
This paper provides an analysis of all the European Commission´s decisions on antitrust cases between January 1999 and February 2004. We use a unique dataset that contains information not only on the cases that were analyzed by the Commission and for which a decision was finally public, but also on all the cases that were never pursued any further or the ones for which there is no public final decision. We have two goals. First, this data allows us, for the first time in the literature, to determine whether there is any type of bias on the selection process followed by the Commission when deciding which cases to pursue until a final decision is reached. Our results show that the selection of cases is not random and that it is quite efficient. Second, we can contribute to determine whether the criteria that have been shown by the economic literature to play an important role on anti competitive behavior, are also important for the Commission´s decision on antitrust cases. Our results suggest that this is the case.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 31

Keywords: anti-trust, competition, selection bias

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Date posted: May 5, 2010  

Suggested Citation

Gual, Jordi and Mas, Nuria, European Commission Decisions on Anti-Competitive Behavior (March 3, 2010). IESE Business School Working Paper No. 846. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1599472 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1599472

Contact Information

Jordi Gual (Contact Author)
University of Navarra - IESE Business School ( email )
Avenida Pearson 21
Barcelona, 08034
Spain
+34 3 253 4200 (Phone)
+34 3 253 4343 (Fax)
la Caixa ( email )
Av Diagonal 629
Barcelona, 08028
Spain
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Nuria Mas
University of Navarra, IESE Business School
Avenida Pearson 21
Barcelona, 08034
Spain
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