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Earnings Management Contagion in Multinational Corporations


Christof Beuselinck


Catholic University of Lille - Institut d'Économie Scientifique et de Gestion (IESEG)

Marc Deloof


University of Antwerp

Ann Vanstraelen


Maastricht University - Department of Accounting & Information Management, MARC (Maastricht Accounting, Auditing & Information Management Research Center)

April 30, 2010


Abstract:     
In this study, we examine whether corporate governance characteristics of multinational corporations (MNCs) and the institutional structure in their home-country influence earnings management by their domestic and foreign-owned subsidiaries. We perform our analyses on a large sample of both publicly traded and privately held majority-owned subsidiaries of listed MNCs across Europe. Our results are consistent with the conjecture that subsidiary-level earnings management is higher when the subsidiary-country institutional quality is weak. Further, we document that the institutional quality of the subsidiary country dominates that of the MNC home-country in explaining the extent of subsidiary-level earnings management. However, we also find that MNC corporate governance characteristics (ownership structure and analyst coverage) do affect the magnitude of subsidiary earnings management, over and above subsidiary-specific characteristics. Overall, our findings are important in that they show that incentives and opportunities of internationally diversified MNCs have contagion effects for their subsidiary-level financial reporting quality.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 35

Keywords: Multinational Corporation (MNC), Earnings Management, Contagion

JEL Classification: F23, M41, M48

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Date posted: May 4, 2010 ; Last revised: May 11, 2010

Suggested Citation

Beuselinck, Christof, Deloof, Marc and Vanstraelen, Ann, Earnings Management Contagion in Multinational Corporations (April 30, 2010). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1599678 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1599678

Contact Information

Christof Beuselinck
Catholic University of Lille - Institut d'Économie Scientifique et de Gestion (IESEG) ( email )
3 Rue de la Digue
Office: A321
Lille, 59000
France
+33320545892 (Phone)
Marc Deloof
University of Antwerp ( email )
Prinsstraat 13
Faculteit TEW
B-2000 Antwerpen
Belgium
+32 3 220 41 69 (Phone)
+32 3 220 47 99 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.ua.ac.be/marc.deloof
Ann Vanstraelen (Contact Author)
Maastricht University - Department of Accounting & Information Management, MARC (Maastricht Accounting, Auditing & Information Management Research Center) ( email )
P.O. Box 616
Maastricht, 6200 MD
Netherlands
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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