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Extreme Walrasian Dynamics: The Gale Example in the Lab


Sean Crockett


Baruch College (CUNY) - Zicklin School of Business - Department of Economics and Finance

Ryan Oprea


University of California, Santa Cruz

Charles R. Plott


California Institute of Technology - Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences

April 2, 2010


Abstract:     
We study the classic Gale (1963) economy using laboratory markets. Tatonnement theory predicts prices will diverge from an equitable interior equilibrium towards infinity or zero depending only on initial prices. The inequitable equilibria selected by these dynamics give all gains from exchange to one side of the market. Our results show surprisingly strong support for these predictions. In most sessions one side of the market eventually outgains the other by more than twenty times, leaving the disadvantaged side to trade for mere pennies. We also find evidence that these dynamics are sticky, resisting exogenous interventions designed to reverse their trajectories.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 44

Keywords: Tatonnement, Disequilibrium, General Equilibrium, Experiment

JEL Classification: C92, D50

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Date posted: May 5, 2010  

Suggested Citation

Crockett, Sean, Oprea, Ryan and Plott, Charles R., Extreme Walrasian Dynamics: The Gale Example in the Lab (April 2, 2010). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1600346 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1600346

Contact Information

Sean Crockett (Contact Author)
Baruch College (CUNY) - Zicklin School of Business - Department of Economics and Finance ( email )
17 Lexington Ave., Box B10-225
New York, NY 10010
United States
646-312-3520 (Phone)
Ryan Oprea
University of California, Santa Cruz ( email )
Santa Cruz, CA 95064
United States
Charles R. Plott
California Institute of Technology - Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences ( email )
1200 East California Blvd.
337 Baxter Hall
Pasadena, CA 91125
United States
626-395-4209 (Phone)
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