Cartel Laws Undermined: Corruption, Social Norms, and Collectivist Business Cultures
University of East Anglia (UEA) - Centre for Competition Policy
Journal of Law and Society, Vol. 37, Issue 2, pp. 345-367, June 2010
The combination of leniency programmes, high sanctions, complaints from customers and private actions for damages, has proven very successful at uncovering and punishing cartel agreements in United States Antitrust Law. Countless jurisdictions are being encouraged to adopt these ‘conventional’ enforcement tools, in the absence of an international competition authority. This paper identifies three issues which may undermine the universal efficacy of these cartel laws: (i) corruption and organized crime; (ii) social norms that are sympathetic to collusive practices; (iii) collectivist business cultures built on personal relationships.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 23Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: May 12, 2010
© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo6 in 0.313 seconds