Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1604816
 


 



Cartel Laws Undermined: Corruption, Social Norms, and Collectivist Business Cultures


Andreas Stephan


University of East Anglia (UEA) - Centre for Competition Policy


Journal of Law and Society, Vol. 37, Issue 2, pp. 345-367, June 2010

Abstract:     
The combination of leniency programmes, high sanctions, complaints from customers and private actions for damages, has proven very successful at uncovering and punishing cartel agreements in United States Antitrust Law. Countless jurisdictions are being encouraged to adopt these ‘conventional’ enforcement tools, in the absence of an international competition authority. This paper identifies three issues which may undermine the universal efficacy of these cartel laws: (i) corruption and organized crime; (ii) social norms that are sympathetic to collusive practices; (iii) collectivist business cultures built on personal relationships.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 23

Accepted Paper Series





Date posted: May 12, 2010  

Suggested Citation

Stephan, Andreas, Cartel Laws Undermined: Corruption, Social Norms, and Collectivist Business Cultures. Journal of Law and Society, Vol. 37, Issue 2, pp. 345-367, June 2010. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1604816 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6478.2010.00507.x

Contact Information

Andreas Stephan (Contact Author)
University of East Anglia (UEA) - Centre for Competition Policy ( email )
UEA
Norwich, Norfolk NR4 7TJ
United Kingdom
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