Cost Behavior and Executive Compensation

Marcus L. Caylor

Kennesaw State University

Thomas J. Lopez

University of Alabama - Culverhouse School of Accountancy

May 13, 2010

Prior literature provides compelling evidence of an asymmetric relation between executive bonus compensation and earnings performance. In particular, this literature reports that compensation committees assign greater weight to good (positive) earnings performance than poor (negative) earnings performance. Taken together, the prior literature provides strong support for critics who claim that compensation committees blindly protect executives from earnings underperformance. We further examine this issue by investigating whether a firm’s cost behavior (i.e., the relation between expenses and sales) provides an explanation for the apparent inefficiency in executive compensation contracts. Our evidence suggests that executives are rewarded more for increases in ROA that arise from normal cost behavior than other increases in ROA consistent with these increases being perceived as more persistent. In contrast, we do not find such a relationship for decreases in ROA which suggests that executives are largely shielded from decreases in ROA that follow normal cost behavior. We examine two factors suggested by the prior literature, expected future sales and the extent of capacity utilization, which may provide an explanation for why executives are shielded from normal cost behavior decreases in ROA. When these additional factors are included in our empirical models, our evidence suggests that the asymmetric relation between changes in CEO bonus compensation and increases and decreases in earnings performance documented in prior literature goes away. That is, our results suggest that compensation committees do not blindly protect executives for earnings underperformance. On the contrary, our evidence suggests that these committees take into account other non-earnings information when deciding how much weight to give to a decrease in earnings and that executive compensation may not be as inefficient as suggested by prior research.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 41

Keywords: Executive Compensation, Cost Behavior, Bonus Compensation, Capacity Utilization

JEL Classification: J3, J33, M40, M52

working papers series

Download This Paper

Date posted: May 14, 2010  

Suggested Citation

Caylor, Marcus L. and Lopez, Thomas J., Cost Behavior and Executive Compensation (May 13, 2010). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1607131 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1607131

Contact Information

Marcus L. Caylor
Kennesaw State University ( email )
1000 Chastain Road
Kennesaw, GA 30144
United States
Thomas J. Lopez (Contact Author)
University of Alabama - Culverhouse School of Accountancy ( email )
Culverhouse College of Business
Tuscaloosa, AL 35487-0223
United States
205-348-2907 (Phone)
Feedback to SSRN

Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 1,273
Downloads: 271
Download Rank: 63,798

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo8 in 0.250 seconds