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Limit-Order Submission Strategies under Asymmetric Information


Lukas Menkhoff


Leibniz Universitaet Hannover - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

Carol L. Osler


Brandeis University - International Business School

Maik Schmeling


City University London - Sir John Cass Business School

May 2010

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 3054

Abstract:     
This paper provides evidence that informed traders dominate the response of limit-order submissions to shocks in a pure limit-order market. In the market we study, informed traders are highly sensitive to spreads, volatility, momentum and depth. By contrast, uninformed traders are relatively insensitive to all these market conditions. The dominance of the informed over limit-order submissions is magnified by contrasts between them and the uninformed in the use of aggressively-priced limit orders.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 42

Keywords: limit-order market, order submission, informed traders, market conditions

JEL Classification: G20

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Date posted: May 19, 2010  

Suggested Citation

Menkhoff, Lukas, Osler, Carol L. and Schmeling, Maik, Limit-Order Submission Strategies under Asymmetric Information (May 2010). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 3054. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1610091

Contact Information

Lukas Menkhoff (Contact Author)
Leibniz Universitaet Hannover - Department of Economics ( email )
Koenigsworther Platz 1
30167 Hannover
Germany
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany
Carol L. Osler
Brandeis University - International Business School ( email )
Mailstop 32
Waltham, MA 02454-9110
United States
781-736-4826 (Phone)
Maik Schmeling
City University London - Sir John Cass Business School ( email )
106 Bunhill Row
London, EC1Y 8TZ
United Kingdom
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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