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Behavioral Antitrust and Merger ControlGregory J. WerdenU.S. Department of Justice - Antitrust Division Luke FroebVanderbilt University - Strategy and Business Economics Mikhael ShorUniversity of Connecticut Department of Economics May 20, 2010 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 2011, Vol. 167, No. 1, pp. 126-142 Vanderbilt Law and Economics Research Paper No. 10-14 Abstract: Scholarship on competition policy has begun to explore the implications of learning from behavioral research and to challenge the assumption of profit maximization at the heart of neoclassical economic theory of the firm. This scholarship is briefly reviewed, focusing on merger control. Prospects for basing merger control entirely on data from actual mergers or laboratory experiments are explored. Also explored are implications of behavioral research for merger assessment in consumer goods industries. The conclusion is that competition policy should continue to rely on neoclassical economic analysis based on the assumption of profit maximization.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 17 Keywords: Behavioral Economics, Antitrust, Mergers JEL Classification: K 21, L41 working papers seriesDate posted: May 20, 2010 ; Last revised: November 20, 2012Suggested CitationContact Information
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