Cooperation and Trust in E-Research - Identification of a Pareto-Digital Paradox by Network Externalities

Abstract:     
One of the major challenges faced by electronic Research (e-Research hereafter) is the lack of collaboration or cooperation will among researchers. Up to now, the literature dealing with the topic has mainly explained the latter observation by emphasizing (i) the importance of physical or face-to-face communications to create trust and then collaboration among individuals (ii) the heterogeneity in ICT adoptions/skills among researchers and (iii) the prominence of an (old) academic `culture’ which tends to only consider or reward single accomplishments. This short piece of work aims at proposing another perspective on the issue by adopting an economic approach. Indeed, we argue that researchers invest in relationships/links with their peers by taking into account the externalities that could result from such links. To do so, we develop a model, in which players (i.e., researchers) agree (bilaterally) to create links in a first period (t=0) and have to make investment decisions regarding the maintenance of those links during the following periods (t >= 1). The benefits to collaborate are parametrized by the exchange of some non-rival information hold and earned by players, whereas the costs to maintain a research collaboration are captured by the play of a standard Prisoner’s Dilemma game and then depend on the cooperative behaviour of both players. After characterization of the efficient outcomes and equilibria of the game, we identify the existence of a paradox between the Pareto efficiency requirements and the equilibrium existence conditions implied by the architecture and features of electronic or digital networks. Indeed, we show that the only social efficient outcome existing for non-empty networks that induces collaborative behaviours is not sustainable (i.e., is not an equilibrium) in large networks such as the ones created by the Internet, where many researchers may be linked to many others (i.e., asymmetric architecture of the network). This essay proposes then to explain the lack of collaboration potentially observed in e-Research by the mismatch existing between the requirements needed to have cooperation as a social efficient outcome and the necessary structural conditions to fulfill in order to be in equilibrium.

Keywords: cooperation, trust,network, externalities, pairwise, stability, electronic, research

working papers series