Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1615486
 
 

Citations (1)



 


 



An Institutional Analysis of the Enforcement Problems in Merger Control


Oliver Budzinski


Ilmenau University of Technology

May 25, 2010


Abstract:     
The literature identifies a significant drop in merger control enforcement activity on both sides of the Atlantic during the last decade. Furthermore, this drop in enforcement activity is convincingly connected to enforcement problems on the sides of the competition agencies. This paper goes beyond the identification of under-enforcement and proceeds to the analysis of causes for the enforcement problems and the discussion of possible solutions. It argues that modern institutional economics suggest that a lack of ‘fit’ between the ‘new’ economic approach to merger control and the ‘old’ institutional environment of the legal enforcement procedures explains the drop of enforcement effectiveness on both sides of the Atlantic by implicitly raising the standard of proof, leading to unattainable standards, virtually eroding merger control enforcement power. As a consequence, the effects-based approach to merger control fails due to its failure to acknowledge its institutional implications. Reconciling industrial and institutional economics – promoting a comprehensive competition economics approach – however offers avenues towards an effective use of sophisticated industrial economic theories and methods. Firstly, incorporating economics into enforceable rules like strong rebuttable presumptions would adjust substantive merger control policy to the procedural institutional environment. Secondly, a reform of the standards of proof provisions would adjust the procedural framework to the characteristics of modern economic evidence and concepts. In summary, the enforcement problems in merger control require even more economic thinking, complementing industrial economic thought with institutional economic thought.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 31

Keywords: Merger Control, European Competition Policy, Antitrust, Enforcement Problems, Institutional Economics, More Economic Approach, Standard of Proof

JEL Classification: K21, L40, D02

working papers series





Download This Paper

Date posted: May 25, 2010  

Suggested Citation

Budzinski, Oliver, An Institutional Analysis of the Enforcement Problems in Merger Control (May 25, 2010). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1615486 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1615486

Contact Information

Oliver Budzinski (Contact Author)
Ilmenau University of Technology ( email )
Ilmenau, D-98684
Germany
HOME PAGE: http://www.tu-ilmenau.de/wth
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 1,021
Downloads: 197
Download Rank: 90,853
Citations:  1

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo5 in 0.281 seconds