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http://ssrn.com/abstract=1615487
 
 

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Trade Credit Contracts


Leora F. Klapper


World Bank; World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG)

Luc Laeven


International Monetary Fund (IMF); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Raghuram G. Rajan


University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; International Monetary Fund (IMF); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

May 25, 2010


Abstract:     
This paper provides new evidence on the unique role of trade credit and contracting terms as a way for both sellers and buyers to mange business risk. We use a novel and unique dataset on almost 30,000 supplier contracts for 56 large buyers and over 24,000 suppliers in Europe and North America. Our sample of buyers and suppliers include firms of varying size, investment grade, and sectors. We find evidence in support of four important, and not mutually exclusive, reasons for trade credit: 1) As a method of financing; 2) As a means of price discrimination; 3) As a bond assuring buyers of product quality; and 4) As a screening mechanism to gauge buyer default risk. In particular, we find that the largest and most creditworthy buyers receive contracts with the longest maturities, as measured by net days, from smaller, investment grade suppliers. In comparison, early payment discounts seem to be used as a risk management tool to limit the potential nonpayment risk of trade credit. In particular, early payment discounts are generally offered to smaller, non-investment grade buyers. Our results suggest that contract terms are jointly determined by supplier and buyer characteristics.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 36

Keywords: Trade Credit, Capital Structure, Contract Theory, Risk Management

JEL Classification: G32

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Date posted: May 25, 2010  

Suggested Citation

Klapper, Leora F. and Laeven, Luc and Rajan, Raghuram G., Trade Credit Contracts (May 25, 2010). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1615487 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1615487

Contact Information

Leora F. Klapper
World Bank ( email )
1818 H Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20433
United States
202-473-8738 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://econ.worldbank.org/staff/lklapper
World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG)
1818 H. Street, N.W.
MSN3-311
Washington, DC 20433
United States
Luc A. Laeven (Contact Author)
International Monetary Fund (IMF) ( email )
700 19th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20431
United States
202-6239020 (Phone)
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Raghuram G. Rajan
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )
5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-702-4437 (Phone)
773-702-0458 (Fax)
International Monetary Fund (IMF) ( email )
700 19th Street NW
Washington, DC 20431
United States
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
773-702-9299 (Phone)
773-702-0458 (Fax)
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References:  30
Citations:  14

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