Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1615589
 
 

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Priceline for Pollution: Auctions to Allocate Public Pollution Control Dollars


Robert W. Adler


University of Utah - S.J. Quinney College of Law

May 25, 2010

William & Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review, Vol. 34, No. 3, p. 745, 2010

Abstract:     
In addition to regulatory strategies, the federal government has spent large amounts of money to pay for or to subsidize pollution control and other environmental measures. Although those expenditures have often achieved environmental improvements, they have not always done so as cost effectively as possible. The use of auctions to distribute funds could significantly improve the cost effectiveness of public spending programs for environmental protection, as it has in other areas of government procurement.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 75

Keywords: Auctions, Auction Theory, Pollution, Pollution Control, Environmental Protection, Pollution Control Markets

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Date posted: May 26, 2010  

Suggested Citation

Adler, Robert W., Priceline for Pollution: Auctions to Allocate Public Pollution Control Dollars (May 25, 2010). William & Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review, Vol. 34, No. 3, p. 745, 2010. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1615589

Contact Information

Robert W. Adler (Contact Author)
University of Utah - S.J. Quinney College of Law ( email )
332 S. 1400 East Room 101
Salt Lake City, UT 84112-0730
United States

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