The NBA and the Great Recession: Implications for the Upcoming Collective Bargaining Agreement Renegotiation

DePaul Journal of Sports and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 6, No. 2, 2010

Marquette Law School Legal Studies Paper No. 10-29

28 Pages Posted: 25 May 2010 Last revised: 13 Jan 2015

See all articles by Matthew J. Parlow

Matthew J. Parlow

Chapman University, The Dale E. Fowler School of Law

Date Written: May 25, 2010

Abstract

Like most businesses, the National Basketball Association (NBA) has suffered significant negative impacts from the Great Recession. The league’s drop in revenue exposed distinct flaws in the NBA’s current business model and in the terms of employment for NBA players. Due to the precarious economic state of the NBA, the league anticipates a contentious, but necessary, renegotiation of the NBA’s collective bargaining agreement (CBA), which will expire at the end of the 2010-11 season. This article will analyze the effects of the Great Recession on the NBA and the likely implications for the renegotiation of the CBA. Part II of this article will provide a macro-level overview of the economic impacts experienced by the NBA during the current economic meltdown. Part III will explore the attendant effects on NBA players. Part IV will then give an overview of the collective bargaining process – including its significance in sports, antitrust, and labor and employment law – and explore the employment terms that will likely become the focus of the upcoming CBA renegotiation. Finally, Part V will provide some concluding insights.

Keywords: NBA, Professional Sports, Basketball, Collective Bargaining, CBA, Economy, Great Recession

JEL Classification: L83

Suggested Citation

Parlow, Matthew J., The NBA and the Great Recession: Implications for the Upcoming Collective Bargaining Agreement Renegotiation (May 25, 2010). DePaul Journal of Sports and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 6, No. 2, 2010, Marquette Law School Legal Studies Paper No. 10-29, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1615666 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1615666

Matthew J. Parlow (Contact Author)

Chapman University, The Dale E. Fowler School of Law ( email )

One University Drive
Orange, CA 92866-1099
United States
714.628.2649 (Phone)

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