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http://ssrn.com/abstract=1616194
 
 

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Optimal Antitrust Enforcement, Dynamic Competition, and Changing Economic Conditions


Keith N. Hylton


William Fairfield Warren Distinguished Professor, Boston University; Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law

Haizhen Lin


Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Business Economics & Public Policy

May 26, 2010

Boston Univ. School of Law Working Paper No. 10-15
Antitrust Law Journal , Vol. 77, No. 1, 2010

Abstract:     
The recent financial crisis and recession provide an opportunity to reexamine the dynamic versus static efficiency tradeoff in antitrust enforcement policy. We examine implications of the optimal antitrust enforcement model when dynamic efficiency is incorporated. The “dynamic enforcement model” examined here provides a positive theory of Section 2 doctrine, some suggestions for modifying enforcement in light of its dynamic costs, and implies antitrust enforcers should put a greater weight on dynamic efficiency during recessions.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 30

Keywords: dynamic competition, static competition, optimal antitrust enforcement, optimal penalty

JEL Classification: K00, K31, K42

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Date posted: May 27, 2010 ; Last revised: May 13, 2014

Suggested Citation

Hylton, Keith N. and Lin, Haizhen, Optimal Antitrust Enforcement, Dynamic Competition, and Changing Economic Conditions (May 26, 2010). Boston Univ. School of Law Working Paper No. 10-15; Antitrust Law Journal , Vol. 77, No. 1, 2010. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1616194

Contact Information

Keith N. Hylton (Contact Author)
William Fairfield Warren Distinguished Professor, Boston University ( email )
595 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02215
United States
617-353-8959 (Phone)
Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law ( email )
765 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02215
United States
617-353-8959 (Phone)
617-353-3077 (Fax)
Haizhen Lin
Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Business Economics & Public Policy ( email )
Bloomington, IN 47405
United States

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