Optimal Antitrust Enforcement, Dynamic Competition, and Changing Economic Conditions
Keith N. Hylton
William Fairfield Warren Distinguished Professor, Boston University; Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law
Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Business Economics & Public Policy
May 26, 2010
Boston Univ. School of Law Working Paper No. 10-15
Antitrust Law Journal , Vol. 77, No. 1, 2010
The recent financial crisis and recession provide an opportunity to reexamine the dynamic versus static efficiency tradeoff in antitrust enforcement policy. We examine implications of the optimal antitrust enforcement model when dynamic efficiency is incorporated. The “dynamic enforcement model” examined here provides a positive theory of Section 2 doctrine, some suggestions for modifying enforcement in light of its dynamic costs, and implies antitrust enforcers should put a greater weight on dynamic efficiency during recessions.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 30
Keywords: dynamic competition, static competition, optimal antitrust enforcement, optimal penalty
JEL Classification: K00, K31, K42Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: May 27, 2010 ; Last revised: May 13, 2014
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