Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1616340
 
 

References (35)



 
 

Citations (8)



 


 



Hedge Fund Activism in Europe


Marco Becht


Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) - Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Julian R. Franks


London Business School; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Jeremy Grant


University of Cambridge

May 26, 2010

ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 283/2010

Abstract:     
The paper analyzes 362 European activist interventions by hedge funds, focus funds and other activist investors from 2000 to 2008. The sample includes both public and private interventions. The private interventions are based upon proprietary data collected from five activist funds. For public interventions the disclosure of acquired stakes is associated with large positive abnormal returns across a number of jurisdictions. Private activism is extensive and profitable but less so than public activism, in large part because the incidence of takeovers is higher in public activism. The returns from hostile activist interventions are more profitable than co-operative ones, and returns for specialist activist funds are substantially larger than for other investors. After controlling for these factors legal jurisdiction does not explain differences in returns across countries.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 47

Keywords: Shareholder Activism, Hedge Funds, Active Ownership, Institutional Investors

JEL Classification: G32

working papers series





Download This Paper

Date posted: June 9, 2010  

Suggested Citation

Becht, Marco and Franks, Julian R. and Grant, Jeremy, Hedge Fund Activism in Europe (May 26, 2010). ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 283/2010. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1616340 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1616340

Contact Information

Marco Becht (Contact Author)
Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) - Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management ( email )
19 Av Franklin Roosevelt
1050
Brussels
Belgium
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )
Avenue des Statuaires 120
Brussels, 1180
Belgium
+32 2 650 4466 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org/members_directory/member.php?member_id=6
Julian R. Franks
London Business School ( email )
Institute of Finance and Accounting
Sussex Place - Regent's Park
London NW1 4SA
United Kingdom
+44 20 7262 5050 x3449 (Phone)
+44 20 7724 3317 (Fax)
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
Jeremy Grant
University of Cambridge ( email )
King's Parade
Cambridge, CB3 0DS
United Kingdom
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 4,694
Downloads: 1,303
Download Rank: 7,615
References:  35
Citations:  8

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo2 in 0.687 seconds