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A Model of Deliberation Based on Rawls’s Political Liberalism


Mostapha Benhenda


Ecole Normale Superieure (ENS)

May 27, 2010

Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 36, pp. 121–178, 2011

Abstract:     
In this paper, we present a model of deliberation based on Rawls’s political liberalism. Our formalization gives a new perspective on his political theory. Moreover, we obtain quantitative results on political deliberation under Rawlsian rules. Finally, we elaborate two arguments in favor of Rawlsian deliberation: first, deliberation is epistemically valuable when, all other things being equal, it tends to favor the better view, because in this case, deliberators settle on the better view with high probability. Second, results suggest that when citizens deliberate within the limits of Rawlsian public reason, they can reach unanimity faster than when they deliberate outside these limits.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 58

Keywords: deliberation, formal model, political liberalism, Rawls

JEL Classification: C69, D70, D71, D72, D74, D82, D83

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Date posted: May 29, 2010 ; Last revised: February 13, 2012

Suggested Citation

Benhenda, Mostapha, A Model of Deliberation Based on Rawls’s Political Liberalism (May 27, 2010). Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 36, pp. 121–178, 2011. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1616519

Contact Information

Mostapha Benhenda (Contact Author)
Ecole Normale Superieure (ENS) ( email )
24 rue Lhomond
75014 Paris
France
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