A Model of Deliberation Based on Rawls’s Political Liberalism
Ecole Normale Superiéure (ENS)
May 27, 2010
Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 36, pp. 121–178, 2011
In this paper, we present a model of deliberation based on Rawls’s political liberalism. Our formalization gives a new perspective on his political theory. Moreover, we obtain quantitative results on political deliberation under Rawlsian rules. Finally, we elaborate two arguments in favor of Rawlsian deliberation: ﬁrst, deliberation is epistemically valuable when, all other things being equal, it tends to favor the better view, because in this case, deliberators settle on the better view with high probability. Second, results suggest that when citizens deliberate within the limits of Rawlsian public reason, they can reach unanimity faster than when they deliberate outside these limits.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 58
Keywords: deliberation, formal model, political liberalism, Rawls
JEL Classification: C69, D70, D71, D72, D74, D82, D83
Date posted: May 29, 2010 ; Last revised: February 13, 2012
© 2016 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollobot1 in 0.203 seconds