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Luxury in Ancient Rome: Scope, Timing and Enforcement of Sumptuary Laws


Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci


University of Amsterdam - Amsterdam Center for Law and Economics (ACLE); Tinbergen Institute

Anna E. Plisecka


University of Amsterdam - Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics (ACLE)

November 22, 2010

Legal Roots, Vol. 1, 2012
Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics Working Paper No. 2010-03

Abstract:     
Between 182 BC and 18 BC, Roman lawmakers enacted a series of sumptuary laws regulating banquets (including the number of guests and the consumption of specific foods). Enforcement was hardly successful and these regulations had to be reiterated over time. Traditional explanations based on morals, protection of patrimonies and electoral competition do not fully account for the scope, timing and enforcement patterns of such laws. We advance and formalize a novel hypothesis holding that sumptuary legislation originated from the misalignment between political and economic power following the military and economic expansion of Rome in the last two centuries of the Republic. During this period, the senatorial class holding political power lost part of its economic power to the emerging class of the equestrians. This unbalance was resolved at the beginning of the Empire as the senatorial class also lost its political power to the princeps. This hypothesis is discussed against the historical and legal background and presented in a formal model.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 27

Keywords: Luxury, Sumptuary Laws, Roman Law, Signaling

JEL Classification: D70, K00, N00

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Date posted: May 28, 2010 ; Last revised: February 29, 2012

Suggested Citation

Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe and Plisecka, Anna E., Luxury in Ancient Rome: Scope, Timing and Enforcement of Sumptuary Laws (November 22, 2010). Legal Roots, Vol. 1, 2012; Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics Working Paper No. 2010-03. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1616712 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1616712

Contact Information

Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci (Contact Author)
University of Amsterdam - Amsterdam Center for Law and Economics (ACLE) ( email )
Roeterstraat 11
Amsterdam, 1018WB
Netherlands
HOME PAGE: http://darimattiacci.acle.nl
Tinbergen Institute
Roetersstraat 31
Amsterdam, 1018 WB
Netherlands
HOME PAGE: http://scholar.google.com/citations?user=AuUfjxUAAAAJ&hl=en
Anna E. Plisecka
University of Amsterdam - Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics (ACLE) ( email )
Roetersstraat 11
Amsterdam, 1018 WB
Netherlands
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